





Previous Approaches						
Name	Description	Used In				
Kernel wrapping	Verify all parameters on calls between the kernel and device drivers	Microsoft Driver Verifier				
Hardware memory protection	Prevent device drivers from writing to kernel memory	Palladium, Shinagawa				
Privilege level change	Prevent device drivers from executing privileged instructions and/or emulate privileged instructions	Exokernel				
Software fault isolation	Inject code into device drivers to ensure that addresses and instructions are safe	Vino				
Safe languages	Rely on the compiler/virtual machine to allow only safe (non-faulting drivers to be loaded	SPIN				
	Name Kernel Wrapping Hardware memory protection Privilege level change Software fault isolation Safe	Name Description   Kernel Verify all parameters on calls between the kernel and device drivers   Hardware Prevent device drivers from writing to kernel memory protection   Privilege Prevent device drivers from executing privileged instructions and/or emulate privileged instructions   Software Inject code into device drivers to fault ensure that addresses and instructions are safe   Safe Rely on the compiler/virtual machine to allow only safe (non-faulting drivers to				


·	A	pproa	ache	S		5
Parameter	Kernel wrappi ng	Hardware memory protection	Privilege level change	Software fault isolation	Safe langu ages	Nooks
Requires rewriting driver	No	No	No	Maybe	Yes	No
Easily supports recovery	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
High performance for small data vol.	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
High performance for large data vol.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Isolates memory corruption	No	Yes	Yes	Maybe	Yes	Yes














## Architecture: "Object Tracking"

### Functionality provided

- Maintain list of kernel data structures manipulated by an extension
- Control modifications to structures
- Provide information for cleanup when extensions fail

#### Internals

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
- Record addresses of kernel objects in use by an extension
- Monitor lifetime of objects and perform garbage collection
- Maintain per protection domain hash table, current task structure etc.





Internals

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- Disable interrupt processing
- Start user mode recovery agent
- release resources in use by extension
- change configuration
- Replace, reload and restart extensions







Overhead Benchmarks								
Benchmark	Extension	XPC	Nooks	Native	Noc			
Deneminark	Extension	Rate	Relative	CPU	CF			
		(per sec)	Performance	Util. (%)	Util.			
Play-mp3	sb	150	1	4.8	4.			
Receive-stream	e1000 (receiver)	8,923	0.92	15.2	15			
Send-stream	e1000 (sender)	60,352	0.91	21.4	39			
Compile-local	VFAT	22,653	0.78	97.5	96			
Serve-simple-web-page	kHTTPd (server)	61,183	0.44	96.6	96			
Serve-complex-web-page	e1000 (server)	1,960	0.97	90.5	92			

# Nooks: Limitations

• Does not provide complete fault tolerance

- Cannot prevent extensions from deliberately executing privileged instructions
- Does not prevent infinite loops inside extensions
- Can perform only a static check in terms of parameters passed
- Recovery is limited to drivers that can be killed and restarted safely

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### Analysis and Conclusions

- Drivers limit OS reliability, are major source of failures
- OS should remove dependence on driver safety
- Existing OS can be extended to run existing driver code safely
- Nooks philosophy is practical and can be easily incorporated
- Nooks lightweight kernel protection domains support reliable driver execution by
  - Preventing kernel corruption
  - Supporting existing driver API

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