

Atomic concepts:

- Store
- Issuer
- Credential
- GovernmentAgency

Atomic roles:

- HasCredential
- IssuedBy
- ControlledBy

Definitions:

- $\text{UntrustedIssuer} \equiv \text{Issuer} \sqcap \neg \exists \text{ControlledBy}.\text{GovernmentAgency}$
- $\text{TrustedIssuer} \equiv \neg \text{UntrustedIssuer}$
- $\text{UntrustedCredential} \equiv \text{Credential} \sqcap \neg \exists \text{IssuedBy}.\text{TrustedIssuer}$
- $\text{TrustedCredential} \equiv \text{Credential} \sqcap \exists \text{IssuedBy}.\text{TrustedIssuer}$
- $\text{TrustedStore} \equiv \text{Store} \sqcap \exists \text{HasCredential}.\text{TrustedCredential}$

Concept assertions:

- $\text{Store}(\text{amazon})$
- $\text{Store}(\text{malroysShadyEmporium})$
- $\text{Issuer}(\text{veriSign})$
- $\text{Issuer}(\text{malroysShadyEmporium})$
- $\text{GovernmentAgency}(\text{nsa})$
- $\text{Credential}(\text{sslCertificate_amazon})$
- $\text{Credential}(\text{sslCertificate_malroysShadyEmporium})$

Role assertions:

- $\text{HasCredential}(\text{amazon}, \text{sslCertificate_amazon})$
- $\text{HasCredential}(\text{malroysShadyEmporium}, \text{sslCertificate_malroysShadyEmporium})$
- $\text{IssuedBy}(\text{sslCertificate_amazon}, \text{veriSign})$
- $\text{IssuedBy}(\text{sslCertificate_malroysShadyEmporium}, \text{malroysShadyEmporium})$

- ControlledBy(veriSign, nsa)

Algorithm Rules

The $\rightarrow \sqcap$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains $(C_1 \sqcap C_2)(x)$, but it does not contain both $C_1(x)$ and $C_2(x)$.

Action: $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A} \cup \{C_1(x), C_2(x)\}$.

The $\rightarrow \sqcup$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains $(C_1 \sqcup C_2)(x)$, but neither $C_1(x)$ nor $C_2(x)$.

Action: $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A} \cup \{C_1(x)\}, \mathcal{A}'' = \mathcal{A} \cup \{C_2(x)\}$.

The $\rightarrow \exists$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains $(\exists R.C)(x)$, but there is no individual name z such that $C(z)$ and $R(x, z)$ are in \mathcal{A} .

Action: $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A} \cup \{C(y), R(x, y)\}$ where y is an individual name not occurring in \mathcal{A} .

The $\rightarrow \forall$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains $(\forall R.C)(x)$ and $R(x, y)$, but it does not contain $C(y)$.

Action: $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A} \cup C(y)$.

The $\rightarrow \geq$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains $(\geq nR)(x)$, and there are no individual names $z_1 \dots z_n$ such that $R(x, z_i)$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$) and $z_i \neq z_j$ ($1 \leq i < j \leq n$) are contained in \mathcal{A} .

Action: $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A} \cup \{R(x, y_i) \mid (1 \leq i \leq n)\} \cup \{y_i \neq y_j \mid 1 \leq i < j \leq n\}$, where $y_1 \dots y_n$ are distinct individual names not occurring in \mathcal{A} .

The $\rightarrow \leq$ -rule

Condition: \mathcal{A} contains distinct individual names $y_1 \dots y_{n+1}$ such that $(\leq nR)(x)$ and $R(x, y_1) \dots R(x, y_{n+1})$ are in \mathcal{A} , and $y_i \neq y_j$ is not in \mathcal{A} for some $i \leq j$.

Action: For each pair y_i, y_j such that $i > j$ and $y_i \neq y_j$ is not in \mathcal{A} , the ABox $\mathcal{A}_{i,j} = [y_i/y_j] \mathcal{A}$ is obtained from \mathcal{A} by replacing each occurrence of y_i by y_j .