On Undefined Behavior in C/C++/Rust

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An slightly modified example of CS3214 p3 student code

```
mm_malloc.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define NUM_LISTS 2
static int list_bsizes[NUM_LISTS] = { 0, 1024 };
static void find_fit(size_t asize) {
    int i = 0:
    for (; i < NUM_LISTS; i++) {</pre>
        if (asize <= list_bsizes[i + 1]) {</pre>
            return:
    printf("I'm here\n");
    return;
```

```
cont'd)
void *mm_malloc(size_t size) {
  if (size <= 1024)
      abort();
  find_fit(size);
  return NULL;
}</pre>
```

What happens if mm_malloc(1025) is called?



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```

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cont'd)
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  return NULL;
}</pre>
```

```
gcc 6.4, with -O2

mm_malloc(unsigned long):
    subq $8, %rsp
    call abort
```



What happened?

- If mm_malloc is called with a size less or equal to 1024, it would call abort() which won't return.
- So find_fit(size) is called with a size greater than 1024.
- The first loop then will access list_bsizes[2] which is out of bounds.
- This is undefined behavior, which can't happen.
- Therefore, find_fit() isn't called.
- Therefore, size must have been less or equal to 1024.
- Therefore, mm_malloc() will always call abort (!?)



Undefined vs. Unspecified Behavior

ISO/IEC 9899:2017: undefined behavior

behavior, upon use of a nonportable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for which this International Standard imposes no requirements^a

unspecified behavior

use of an unspecified value, or other behavior where this International Standard provides two or more possibilities and imposes no further requirements on which is chosen in any instance

implemented-defined behavior: unspecified behavior where each implementation documents how the choice is made

^aNote 1 to entry: Possible undefined behavior ranges from ignoring the situation completely with unpredictable results, to behaving during translation or program execution in a documented manner characteristic of the environment (with or without the issuance of a diagnostic message), to terminating a translation or execution (with the issuance of a diagnostic message).

Examples of Unspecified Behavior

- The manner and timing of static initialization
- Many aspects of the representations of types
- The value of padding bytes when storing values in structures or unions
- Whether two string literals result in distinct arrays
- The order in which the function designator, arguments, and subexpressions within the arguments are evaluated in a function call
- The order in which the operands of an assignment operator are evaluated
- ... and many more (total over 60 items)



Examples of Undefined Behavior

- A "shall" or "shall not" requirement that appears outside of a constraint is violated¹
- An object is referred to outside of its lifetime
- The value of a pointer to an object whose lifetime has ended is used
- The value of an object with automatic storage duration is used while it is indeterminate
- Conversion to or from an integer type produces a value outside the range that can be represented
- The execution of a program contains a data race
- ... the entire list fills 10 pages in appendix J.2



Undefined Behavior

¹The word "shall" appears 943 times in the document

Security Impact

• In a paper at SOSP'13 [3], Wang et al analyzed code bases for reliance on undefined behavior. They found instances in thousands of C/C++ packages.

Source: Vulnerability Note VU#162289, US-CERT, 2008

```
char *buf = ...;
char *buf_end = ...;
unsigned int len = ...;
if (buf + len >= buf_end)
  return; /* len too large */
if (buf + len < buf)
  return; /* overflow, buf+len wrapped around */
/* write to buf[0..len-1] */</pre>
```



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```

 Compiler knows that pointer arithmetic overflow is undefined behavior, so it "knows" that buf + len is always greater or equal than buf and elides the check.

Security Impact: Null dereferencing [1]

TUN driver: NULL check optimized out

```
static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
    struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
    struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
    struct sock *sk = tun->sk;
    unsigned int mask = 0;

    if (!tun) // Optimized out with -O2
        return POLLERR;
}
```

- What if NULL is a valid address in some kernel implementations and architectures (Like ARM)?
- Kernel might be attacked if NULL check is eroded.



Practical Consequences

- First, intuition is wrong: cannot reason about what might happen to code that exhibits undefined behavior. "It will crash..." or "It'll eventually overrun the bounds..." etc. do not work.
- Second, you must use the (limited) tools we do have available:
 - Valgrind: flags undefined behavior that the compiler didn't recognize and eliminate²
 - Undefined sanitizer (ubsan), see https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan



²I am not referring to looking for memory leaks with valgrind, which is a different topic altogether.

References

- [1] Jonathan Corbet.Fun with null pointers.https://lwn.net/Articles/342330/.
- [2] Chris Lattner.
 What every c programmer should know about undefined behavior.
 https://blog.llvm.org/2011/05/what-every-c-programmer-should-know.html.
- [3] Xi Wang, Nickolai Zeldovich, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Armando Solar-Lezama. Towards optimization-safe systems: Analyzing the impact of undefined behavior. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles*, SOSP '13, page 260–275, New York, NY, USA, 2013. Association for Computing Machinery.
- [4] Victor Yodaiken.

 How ISO C became unusable for operating systems development.

 In Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating