

The use of public-key cryptography and X.509 certificates in a distributed server system to establish secure domains and trusted relationships. This supports these assurance services that are necessary for the conduct of electronic business.



<u>Public-key Cryptography</u> - Generate key pairs - one public, the other private (asymmetric). Owner of key pair uses private key to en/decrypt. Others uses public key to en/decrypt.



The public keys of a user, together with some other information rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private key of the CA that issued it. [Ref. X.509] (AKA user certificate; public key certificate)

Its purpose is to reliably associate a user and their public key. It includes the user's distinguished name, which may include additional attributes that uniquely identify the user. The certificate specifies a validity period, and the specific operations for which the public key is to be used. Users can trust that that the public key recovered belongs to the entity specified by the distinguished name.

Public key is susceptible to spoofing and "man-in-middle" attacks – mismatch key and owner. Certificates binding user and public key mitigates that.

A repository is an on-line, publicly accessible system for storing and retrieving certificates and other information relevant to certificates, such as revocation information. In effect, putting a certificate in a repository publishes it.



| version | version number; an integer, value is "2" for version 3 | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|
| serial number | unique identifier for each certificate generated by issuer; integer | |
| signature algorithm | algorithm identifier | algorithm used to sign certificate |
| ID | parameters | should not be used |
| issuer name | name of issuer (X.500 "distinguished name" that uniquely identifies a directory object). | |
| validity period | notBefore | Time |
| | notAfter | Time |
| subject name | name of subject (X.500 "distinguished name") | |
| subject public key | algorithm identifier | subject's signature algorithm |
| info | parameters | parameters applicable to subj. pub. key |
| | public key | subject's public key |
| issuer unique identi- fier | (optional) contains additional information about the subject; certificate must be version 2 or higher - not used by the Federal PKI. | |
| subject unique identi- fier | (optional) contains additional information about the issuer; certificate must be version 2 or higher - not used by the Federal PKI. | |
| extensions | (optional) | |
| issuer's signature | algorithm identifier | algorithm used for this signature |
| | parameters | should not be used |
| | ENCRYPTED (certifi | cate hash) |

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| Key and Policy Informatic | |
| authorityKevIdentifier | identifies the CA key used to sign this certificate |
| subjectKeyIdentifier | identifies different keys for same subject |
| | defines allowed purposes for use of key (e.g. digital |
| keyUsage | signature, key agreement) |
| privateKeyUsagePeriod | for digital signature keys only. Signatures on |
| | documents that purport to be dated outside the period |
| | are invalid. |
| certificatePolicies | policy identifiers and qualifiers that identify and |
| certificater bilcles | qualify the policies that apply to the certificate |
| policyMappings | indicates equivalent policies |
| Certificate Subject and Is | suer Attributes |
| subjectAltName | used to list alternative names (e.g., rfc822 name, |
| eusjeen uutume | X.400 address, IP address,) |
| issuerAltName | used to list alternative names |
| subjectDirectoryAttributes | lists any desired attributes |
| Certificate Path Constrain | nts |
| basicConstraints | constraints on subject's role & path lengths |
| nameConstraints | limits subsequent CA cert. Name space |
| policyConstraints | constrains certs. issued by subsequent CAs |
| CRL Identification | |
| cRLDistributionPoints | mechanism to divide long CRL into shorter lists |
| distributionPoint | location from which CRL can be obtained |
| reasons | reasons for cert. inclusion in CRL |
| - Di la susa | name of component that issues CRL |

Key and Policy Information - These extensions provide information to identify a particular public key and certificate. They may restrict the purposes for which a key may be used.

Certificate Subject and Issuer Attributes - These extensions provide additional information about other names and attributes of the subject and issuer.

Certificate Path Constraints - These extensions apply to restrictions place on validation of certificate paths. (An ordered sequence of certificates in a hierarchy which, together with the public key of the initial certificate, can be walked back to the root certificate that established trust.)

CRL Identification - These extensions include information in a certificate about where to obtain the CRL that applies to a certificate.



<u>Distributed Server System</u> - An architecture of servers (e.g., directory, messaging, certificate, etc.) for distributing applications transparently across networks of heterogeneous computers.

Server: A provider of resources (e.g. name server).



<u>Identification & Authentication</u> - The sender is who they claim to be. Also, <u>Authorization</u> - what they can do. And <u>Access Control</u> - with what system resources

An established procedure that requires those applying for certificates to appear in person and identify themselves to the Local Registration Authority.

The CA by issuing a certificate guarantees that you and your public key match. You know the CA issued the certificate because the CA's public key decrypts it.

Authentication is done because you need the sender's public key to decrypt the data he sent you.



Non-repudiation - The sender cannot later deny the data.

The file is passed through a hashing algorithm which creates a unique numerical representation of the file. This is then encrypted with the sender's private key, and appended to the original file to create the Digital Envelope. The Digital Envelope is then encrypted with the receiver's public key.



Once created, the Digital Envelope can be encrypted using the Receiver's readily available Public Key. This "sealed" Digital Envelope is then transmitted via the Internet. It can only be read after the intended Receiver has decrypted the message using his private key.



To establish confidence that the received message has not been tampered with while in transit, the recipient does the following:

1. Using the same hashing algorithm as the sender the receiver creates a numerical representation of the file.

2. Using the sender's public key, decrypts the digital signature that accompanied the file to recover the hash output the sender created.

3. Compares the two numerical values to ensure they are the same.