Protection and Security

Issues:

authentication: verifying a claim of identity
authorization: verifying a claim of permission
audit: verifying the (non)occurrence of previous actions



Reference Monitor Model

- **Au**thentication
- **Au**thorization
- **Au**dit

(**Au** = gold)

aka: AAA

From: "Computer Security in the Real World", Lampson, 2004.

Security Goals and Principles

Goals:

- integrity - modification only by authorized parties
- confidentiality - access only by authorized parties
- non-repudiation - inability to disclaim authorship
- authenticity - verifiability of source
- availability - continuous access by authorized parties

Principles:

- least privilege - minimization of rights
- separation of duties (by task, by person)
- economy of mechanism - simplest means of enforcement
- acceptability – adoptable/usable by user community
- complete mediation - universal enforcement of control
- open design - secrecy of enforcement mechanisms is not important

Elements of a Secure System

- Specification/Policy
  - secrecy
  - integrity
  - availability
  - accountability
- Implementation/Mechanism
  - isolation (impractical)
  - exclusion (code signing, firewalls)
  - restriction (sandboxing)
  - recovery
  - punishment
- Correctness/Assurance
  - trusted computing base
  - defense in depth
  - usability
  - theory

From: “Computer Security in the Real World”, Lampson, 2004

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Access Matrix

Access Matrix Model



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Access Matrix

objects

subjects

	S_1	S_2	S_3	F_1	F_2	D_1	D_2
S_1	control	owner block unblock	owner control	read* write*	read write	seek	owner
S_2	block unblock	control		owner	update	owner	seek*
S_3			control	delete	owner execute		

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Manipulating the Access Matrix

Rule	Command (by S_0)	Conditions	Operation
R_1	transfer {a/a*} to S,X	a* in A[S_0,X]	store {a/a*} in A[S,X]
R_2	grant {a/a*} to S,X	*owner* in A[S_0,X]	store {a/a*} in A[S,X]
R_3	delete a from S,X	*control* in A[S_0,S] or *owner* in A[S_0,X]	delete a from A[S,X]
R_4	w = read S,X	*control* in A[S_0,S] or *owner* in A[S_0,X]	copy A[S,X] into w
R_5	create object X		add column for X to A; place *owner* in A[S,X]
R_6	destroy object X	*owner* in A[S_0,X]	delete column for X from A
R_7	create subject S		add a row for S to A; place *owner* in A[S0,S]; place *control* in A[S,S]
R_8	destroy subject S	*owner* in A[S_0,X]	delete row for S from A;

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Capability Lists



Capability Lists

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Access Control Lists



Access Control Lists

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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)



Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

- Roles of model particular jobs or duties in an organization
- Single user may play multiple roles at the same or different times
- Multiple users may play the same role at the same or different times
- The user-role assignment may be made separately from the role-permission assignment

Classes, Levels, Domains

	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	O_5	
s_1	r_1	r_1		r_1		
s_2			r_1	r_3	r_1	
s_3	r_2	r_2	r_3		r_3	

Grouped by multiple objects

O_1 & O_2	O_3 & O_5	O_4
(s_1, r_1)	(s_2, r_1)	(s_1, r_1)
(s_3, r_2)	(s_3, r_3)	(s_2, r_3)

classes, levels, domains

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Bell-LaPadula Model



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Lock and Key Method

subjects possess a set of keys:



objects are associated with a set of locks:

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Comparison of methods

	Capability list	Access Control links	Locks & Keys
propagation	☹ 1	☹ 3	☹ 1
review	☹	☺	☹ 4
revocation	☹	☺	☹ 4
reclamation	☹ 2	☺	☺

1. need copy bit/count for control
2. need reference count
3. need user/hierarchical control
4. need to know subject-key mapping

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