Somewhere in the western desert near Mubarak military city, a stand full of Egyptian military officers are straining their eyes to the horizon. Out there, they have been told, there's a Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment bearing down on them. Rushing in defense is a force barely a third the size -- four companies of the US 3rd mechanized infantry division backed by engineers and artillery. The 3rd deploys. Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles come howling out of the hills behind, dust billowing from their treads, and bury themselves in entrenchments. On the wings, Apache helicopters hover like malignant insects. The attackers close. The uncanny whoop of missile fire gives warning that lead elements are being picked off. Then the imaginary regiment enters cannon range, wooden targets pop up, and the tanks go to work. The Abrams isn't just the most powerful tank in the world, it's also the most nimble -- it can accelerate out of the near invulnerability of its burrow, fire, duck back in, and seven seconds later it's ready to fire again. Quickly, methodically, and with little risk to themselves, the four companies of the 3rd shred the Soviet regiment to nothing. 
Operation Bright Star -- Egypt's biannual ritual of alliance with the United States -- is a spectacle equal to the opera Aida. And like the staging of the grand opera, it's as much political statement as spectacle. But it's also a demonstration of American military supremacy. The live-fire exercise described above shows what would happen if a US-style force got into a scrap with a Soviet-style force in the Middle East. The tactics developed in Europe to halt a numerically superior but less flexible force are even more effective in the desert. And in the Middle East, virtually all the systems are primarily Soviet. The main exception, of course, is Israel. 
Egypt has a hybrid system, which the military claims is suited to its capabilities. In recent years, generals have always stressed how each subsequent exercise increases the flexibility of low-level commanders to make their own decisions, a feature of American doctrine. But the big difference is the use of airpower. US military doctrine lets ground commanders control low-altitude airspace, so that air and ground elements fight as one. The tanks pin the enemy down and the jets and helicopters go in for the kill. Each Apache, for example, can rain 16 Hellfire laser- or radar-guided missiles on an attacking force, and they don't miss much. In the Egyptian military, as in the Soviet one, airspace is commanded centrally. Bombers and helicopters might soften up the enemy positions, but they're well out of the way when the mailed fist of the armor smashes down. Last week's mock battle showed how to block such a fist. 
The US and Egypt have staged Bright Star every two years since 1981, recently bringing in forces from Britain, France, and several of the Gulf States to join the festivities. It's one of the largest exercises anywhere in the world, lasting nearly a month and involving 58,000 troops altogether. The meat of the operation, the FTX (field training exercise), hasn't changed much in the past few years. It's a replay of the Gulf Crisis. An aggressive Iraqiesque "orange" force, played by Egyptian troops, enters the 40 by 80 kilometer battle area from the west. The green coalition intervenes. First they stage an amphibious invasion to block the attacker's armored spearheads. With commandos swarming ashore, fighters and helicopters prowling the beaches, amphibious landing craft crawling through the surf, and tank-bearing hovercrafts whizzing over the waves, the invasion is played for all the pageantry it's worth. Then the coalition brings up reinforcements -- Egyptian, American, British, and French. In classic air-land battle style, they pin down the enemy columns before annihilating them from the air. The generals have already predetermined the outcome, but the tactics, in large part, are up to the unit commanders. The games are supposed to teach coalition warfare. "Interoperability" is the military buzzword -- learn how to coordinate radio frequencies, operate in ally-controlled airspace, see if you can supply each other fuel and ammunition, or just get a feeling of how the other guy does his thing. "In the 1990s, a unilateral US operation is just not going to happen," explained Major Derrick Miller of 1st brigade, 3rd division. "Coalition operations are the operations of the future." 
Just before Bright Star, Egypt staged a somewhat different kind of exercise. The Third Army launched an attack along both sides of the Suez Canal -- an armored punch against an entrenched enemy. This enemy, the communique said, was assumed to have electronic and air superiority. And when you talk about going up against a foe with these capabilities, it's obvious you aren't talking about Sudan, Libya, Iraq, or any other country in the Arab world. 
It's no secret that the Egyptian wargames serve a political message. Last year's Badr 96, described as the largest manoeuvers since the 1973 war, left Netanyahu squirming in indignation when the Second and Third Armies staged a massive recrossing of the Suez Canal to confront a "hostile" force east of the waterway. Militarily, that's not too likely a scenario for the near future, but politically, it's magnificent theater. It's a way of saying to the Israelis -- don't throw your weight around the Middle East so much, because if you force us into war, we'll give you a run for your money. 
How could such a war come about? The defense ministry won't speculate in public, but the analysts will tell you that if Netanyahu starts a war with Syria, then Egypt might feel it has no choice. In this case, Egypt would have three options: launch ballistic missiles and risk a devastating counterstrike, stage a long-term naval blockade in the central Mediterranean and risk breaking international law, or send its men into the Sinai, into the teeth of the Israeli Defense Forces. In the last case, it's conceivable that the Egyptian air force could hold off the Israeli air force for a few days, but the army still needs to show that its ground forces can inflict blows upon the enemy. 
Have they? Foreign observers of Egypt's military training commend the military's professionalism, its realistic view of its own capabilities, and its willingness to adopt new tactics. They credit it with successfully operating the most sophisticated equipment in the world -- an impressive accomplishment with a conscript army, a somewhat pampered officer class, and minimal media or parliamentary oversight. Exercises such as Badr or Bright Star are large and tactically ambitious. But the observers don't think that the military pushes itself to the limit. A fighter plane capable of a tight 9G turn -- stressful to plane and pilot, but an essential manoeuver to master in a dogfight -- is only taken to a leisurely 3Gs. Apache helicopters, equipped with vastly expensive and sophisticated night vision equipment, until recently were only flown during the day. This impression was backed up by Egypt's Gulf War performance -- the divisions assigned to the liberation of Kuwait City accomplished their mission with minimal casualties, but they couldn't keep to the breakneck schedule demanded by the American planners. The impression that the military says it seeks to give -- a force gearing up to accomplish feats such as those of 1973 -- isn't getting through to the outside world. 
This doesn't mean that Egypt couldn't pull an October surprise. The military guards its secrets -- from the press and the People's Assembly as well as from foreign observers. But there's no such thing as a hidden deterrent. Train like you mean it, say foreign observers. Run joint air defense exercises with Syria. Master the air/land battle. Don't fly up your Apaches in daylight, hover, and start shooting -- they wouldn't survive a minute against a foe with air superiority. Send them in during the darkness, dodging and weaving at 50 feet off the ground. 
It's doubtful that the Americans staged the mock destruction of the Soviet regiment near Mubarak military city in order to teach a political lesson. But the lesson's there nonetheless. Without air superiority, which Egypt admits it will never hold over Israel in the near future, a competent military cannot wage offensive war in the desert against a foe employing state-of-the-art weaponry. Only an exceptional military can hold its own, let alone prevail. To achieve such a military, it's not enough to refight old victories.