

Cryptographic Security

Presenter: Hamid Al-Hamadi


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CS5204 – Fall 2009




Security Goals

- Consider the following security risks that could face two communicating entities in an unprotected environment:




- C could view the secret message by eavesdropping on the communication.

Loss of privacy/confidentiality



C could alter/corrupt the message, or the message could change while in transit. If B does not detect this, then we have **Loss of Integrity**

(3) Or it could send a message to B pretending to be A



If B cannot verify the source entity of the information then we **lack authentication**

(4) A \xrightarrow{m} B

A might **repudiate** having sent m to B


Hence, some possible goals for communication:

- **Privacy/confidentiality - information not disclosed to unauthorized entities**
- **Integrity - information not altered deliberately or accidentally**
- **Authentication - validation of identity of source of information**
- **Non-repudiation – Sender should not be able to deny sending a message**

What is Cryptography

- Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.

What is a cryptographic system composed of?




- **Plaintext:** original message or data (also called cleartext)
- **Encryption:** transforming the plaintext, under the control of the key
- **Ciphertext:** encrypted plaintext
- **Decryption:** transforming the ciphertext back to the original plaintext
- **Cryptographic key:** used with an algorithm to determine the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, and v.v.

Attack classification

Ciphertext Alone attack: The attacker has available only the intercepted cryptogram C .


From C , try to find P or (even better) the key.



Attack classification

Known Plaintext attack: The attacker knows a small amount of plaintext (P_i) and its ciphertext Equivalent (C_i).


Attacker tries to find key or to infer P_{i+1} (next plaintext)



Attack classification

Chosen Plaintext attack: The attacker can choose plaintext (P_i) and obtain its ciphertext (C_i).

A careful selection of (P_i) would give a pair of (P_i, C_i) good for analyzing Enc. Alg. + key and in finding P_{i+1} (next plaintext of sender)




Forms of Cryptosystems

- **Private Key (symmetric) :**

A single key (**K**) is used for both encryption and decryption and must be kept secret.

Key distribution problem - a secure channel is needed to transmit the key before secure communication can take place over an unsecure channel.



Forms of Cryptosystems


- **Public Key (asymmetric):**
 - The encryption procedure (key) is public while the decryption procedure (key) is private.
 - Each participant has a public key and a private key.
 - May allow for both encryption of messages and creation of digital signatures.

Forms of Cryptosystems

- **Public Key (asymmetric):**


Requirements:

1. For every message M , encrypting with public key and then decrypting resulting ciphertext with matching private key results in M .
2. Encryption and Decryption can be efficiently applied to M
3. It is impractical to derive decryption key from encryption key.



Combining Public/Private Key Systems

Public key encryption is more expensive than symmetric key encryption
For efficiency, combine the two approaches



- (1) Use public key encryption for authentication; once authenticated, transfer a shared secret symmetric key**
- (2) Use symmetric key for encrypting subsequent data transmissions**

Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) Method

- Named after the designers: **R**ivest, **S**hamir, and **A**dleman
- Public-key cryptosystem and digital signature scheme.
- Based on difficulty of factoring large integers
 - For large primes p & q , $n = pq$
 - Public key e and private key d calculated

RSA Key Generation

Every participant must generate a Public and Private key:

1. Let p and q be large prime numbers, randomly chosen from the set of all large prime numbers.

2. Compute $n = pq$.

3. Choose any large integer, d , so that:

$$\text{GCD}(d, \varphi(n)) = 1 \quad (\text{where } \varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1))$$

4. Compute $e = d^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$.

5. Publish n and e . Keep p , q and d secret.

Note:

- Step 4 can be written as:


Find e so that: $e \times d = 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$

- If we can obtain p and q , and we have (n, e) , we can find d

Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) Method

Assume A wants to send something confidentially to B:

- A takes M , computes $C = M^e \bmod n$, where (e, n) is B's public key. Sends C to B
- B takes C , finds $M = C^d \bmod n$, where (d, n) is B's private key



RSA Method

Example:

1. $p = 5$, $q = 11$ and $n = 55$.

$$(p-1) \times (q-1) = 4 \times 10 = 40$$

2. A valid d is 23 since $\text{GCD}(40, 23) = 1$

3. Then $e = 7$ since:

$$23 \times 7 = 161 \text{ modulo } 40 = 1$$

in other words

$$e = 23^{-1} \pmod{40} = 7$$

Digital Signatures Based on RSA

In RSA algorithm the encryption and decryption operations are commutative:

$$(m^e)^d = (m^d)^e = m$$

We can use this property to create a digital signature with RSA.

Digital Signatures (Public Key)

Public Key System:

sender, A: (E_A : public, D_A : private)

receiver, B: (E_B : public, D_B : private)

A signs the message m using its private key,
the result is then encrypted with B's public key, and the resulting
ciphertext is sent to B:

$$C = E_B (D_A (M))$$

B receives ciphertext C decrypts it using its private key
The result is then encrypted with the senders public key (A's public
key) and the message m is retrieved

$$M = E_A (D_B (C))$$


Hashing

A one-way hash function h is a public function h (which should be simple and fast to compute) that satisfies three properties:

1. A message m of arbitrary length must be able to be converted into a message digest $h(m)$ of fixed length.
2. It must be one-way, that is given $y = h(m)$ it must be computationally infeasible to find m .
3. It must be collision free, that is it should be computationally infeasible to find m_1 and m_2 such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$.

Examples: MD5 , SHA-1

Hash Function




Producing Digital Signatures

Step 1: A produces a one-way hash of the message.

Step 2: A encrypts the hash value with its private key, forming the signature.

Step 3: A sends the message and the signature to B.




Verifying Digital Signature

Step 4: B forms a one-way hash of the message.

Step 5: B uses A's public key to decrypt the signature and obtain the sent hash.

Step 6: compare the computed and sent hashes



Security of Digital Signatures

If the hashes match then we have guaranteed the following:

- **Integrity**: if m changed then the hashes would be different
- **Authenticity & Non-repudiation**: A is who sent the hash, as we used A's public key to reveal the contents of the signature A cannot deny signing this, nobody else has the private key.

Satisfies the requirements of a Digital Signature

If we wanted to further add **confidentiality**, then we would encrypt the sent m + signature such that only B could reveal the contents (encrypt with B's public key)

Possible problem: If signing modulus $>$ encrypting modulus
-> **Reblocking Problem**


Secure Communication (Public Key)

Handshaking

I_A, I_B are “nonces”

nonces can be included in each subsequent message

PKB: public key of B; PKA: public key of A;



Questions?